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It is common to consider monetary policy as a unidimensional problem, involving
only the choice of an operating target for some short-term interest rate (the federal
funds rate, in the case of the Federal Reserve). But other aspects of policy have
been at center stage much of the time in the Fed’s response to the recent financial
crisis. In particular, whereas the Fed has traditionally adhered (at least to a large
extent) to a policy of “Treasuries only” (Goodfriend, 2009), under which the only
asset on its balance sheet should be (mostly short-term) U.S. Treasury securities,
the Fed has recently been involved in fairly large-scale extensions of credit to private
institutions. These new programs have included “liquidity facilities” that extend
(relatively short-term) credit to financial institutions of various types; facilities like
the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (or TALF), discussed in this paper,
that provide longer-term financing for purchasers of privately-issued financial assets,
and thus effectively make the Fed a financial intermediary itself, rather than a mere
supplier of liquidity to such intermediaries; and direct purchases of securities other
than Treasuries, as in the case of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (or CPFF),
which I discuss further below.1
It is therefore an important question for the theory of monetary policy to con-
sider to what extent these additional dimensions of policy serve additional purposes,
that could not already be adequately achieved through a proper use of traditional
interest-rate policy. There are actually two questions that need to be considered:
first, whether such policies should be effective at all, in changing financial conditions;
and second, to the extent that they are effective, whether they are simply substitutes
for more aggressive use of interest-rate policy. The present paper is one of the first to
directly address these important questions; it provides cogent theoretical and empiri-
cal analyses of the first question, and an interesting theoretical argument with regard
to the second question as well. Notably, the paper’s argument for the relevance of
central-bank “haircut policy” even given the availability of traditional interest-rate
policy does not turn on the observation that interest-rate policy is sometimes (as
in the U.S. since December 2008) constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates; this raises the possibility that active intervention along this dimension
might be desirable on a routine basis, and not only during especially severe crises
(which are the only times that the zero lower bound is likely to be an issue).
1See, for example, Madigan (2009) for an overview of the new programs, and Reis (2009) for an
early discussion of the theoretical differences between programs of these different types.
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1 Breaking the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Central-
Bank Financial Policy
The authors’ theoretical analysis of why central-bank “haircut policy” — specifically,
the willingness of the central bank to accept assets as collateral for loans under
terms that are more generous than those prevailing in the market in the absence of
central-bank lending — can affect equilibrium asset prices, and hence the allocation
of resources, is an important contribution. The approach that they take draws upon
earlier work by Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) on the role of margin constraints in
explaining violations of the law of one price in financial markets. I shall not undertake
a general assessment of that theory here, but I want to comment on the importance
of certain features of that theory for the conclusions reached. In fact, not all theories
regarding the sources of observed spreads between the rates of return on alternative
financial instruments lead to the same conclusions regarding the scope for additional
dimensions of central-bank policy; awareness of the differences may allow future work
to focus more sharply on distinguishing the empirical relevance of these alternative
theories, which will be important for further progress in the theory of monetary policy.
The most common explanation for why there should in principle be multiple di-
mensions of central-bank policy is based on portfolio-balance theory. According to
this theory, changes in the portfolio held by the central bank change the aggregate
portfolio that must be held in equilibrium by private investors; and to the extent that
the assets between which the central bank substitutes are not perfect substitutes, it is
expected that a change in the relative prices of the different assets will be necessary
to induce this portfolio substitution by private investors. In this view, the key to
whether a given change in the central bank’s portfolio should affect equilibrium rates
of return is the degree to which the assets involved are perfect substitutes or not; and
(in accordance with the modern theory of finance) it is often supposed that what de-
termines whether different assets are substitutes is the respective contingencies under
which they pay out a greater or lesser amount.2
But the mere fact that different assets have different state-contingent returns
2Thus Gagnon et al. (2010) discuss the theoretical basis for the Fed’s Large Scale Asset Purchase
program by noting that “the LSAPs have removed a considerable amount of assets with high duration
from the markets.... In addition, the purchases of MBS reduce the amount of prepayment risk that
investors have to hold in the aggregate.”
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does not suffice to imply that the fact that the central bank purchases one of them
rather than the other must have any effect on equilibrium asset prices, and hence
on the allocation of resources. For example, in a representative-household asset-
pricing theory, the equilibrium price of each asset should equal the present value
of the income stream to which it is a claim, where the stochastic discount factor
used to compute present values is based on the state-contingent consumption of the
representative household. If a change in the portfolio of the central bank changes
neither the state-contingent income stream associated with a single unit of a given
asset nor the state-contingent aggregate supply of goods available for consumption,
it should have no effect on the equilibrium price of the asset.3
Representative-agent asset-pricing theories have well-known difficulties account-
ing for the empirical behavior of asset prices; in particular, the size and variability of
the spreads between the returns on different assets are difficult to account for without
the hypothesis of time-varying risk premia, of a kind that are not easily explained
by the relatively smooth variations observed in aggregate consumption. But the neu-
trality result just mentioned does not depend on the assumption of a representative
household. The key to the result is the fact that, if the central bank shifts its portfo-
lio among assets with different state-contingent payoffs, the state-contingent portfolio
earnings of the central bank will be different as a result of the policy change, and
these state-contingent portfolio earnings must be distributed to someone in the pri-
vate sector (to the representative household, in a representative-household model).4
This changes the degree to which the private investors demand particular assets in
order to hedge against risks associated with its other sources of income.5
3This is the basis for the irrelevance result for unconventional monetary policies obtained in
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
4The direct consequence of a change in the state-contingent earnings of the central bank is
a corresponding change in the state-contingent distribution that the central bank makes to the
Treasury; but the change in the Treasury’s state-contingent income from this source must ultimately
change the net state-contingent tax obligations of parties in the private sector.
5Hedging demands of this kind are frequently ignored in portfolio-balance models. When the
securities demand functions in such models are explicitly derived from an analysis of investors’
attitudes toward risk, as in Tobin (1997), a problem is typically considered in which investors have
initial wealth to allocate and no future non-financial income or tax obligations at the time when the
securities pay off. Macroeconomic models often simply postulate asset demands that are functions
of the expected returns on the various available assets, without using any explicit choice problem to
motivate them.
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In the representative-agent model, the change in the hedging demand of the rep-
resentative household precisely offsets the change in the central bank’s portfolio, so
that asset markets continue to clear at the same prices as before. But the argument
is essentially a Modigliani-Miller theorem for changes in the net asset issuance of the
government, as first pointed out by Wallace (1981), and doesn’t depend at all on the
existence of a representative agent. In fact, the only postulates needed to obtain the
irrelevance result are (i) that all investors can buy or sell the same set of assets at the
same market prices, and (ii) that each investor’s objective, and the only relevant con-
straints on her portfolio choice, can be stated purely in terms of the state-contingent
future value of her wealth.6
These postulates may well be satisfied, even a model that incorporates time-
varying risk premia due to variation in the resources of the “natural buyers” of risky
assets, and that allows for the amplification of disturbances by “leverage spirals.” The
model proposed by Adrian and Shin (2010) provides a simple example. In this two-
period model, investors are of two types, one of which funds the leveraged investment
of the other (just as in the model proposed here). Letting the random variable W h2
denote the second-period value of the investor h’s wealth, “passive investors” are
assumed to choose a portfolio to maximize
E[W p2 ]− αVar[W p2 ],
where α > 0 parameterizes their degree of risk aversion; “active investors” instead
choose a portfolio to maximize E[W a2 ] subject to a “value-at-risk constraint”, which
requires that
W a2 ≥ 0
with probability 1. Both types choose arbitrary positions in two assets, a risky asset
and a riskless asset, and are price-takers in the markets for these assets.
Now suppose that, in the model of Adrian and Shin, we were to introduce a central
bank, that purchases a quantity xcb of the risky asset at the market price in the first
period, and finances these open-market purchases by selling an equal quantity of the
riskless asset. (Here I measure both quantities by the first-period market values of
the assets purchased or sold.) This results in state-contingent second-period portfolio
earnings for the central bank equal to (R − r)xcb, where R is the (random) return
6See Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) for further discussion.
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on the risky asset and r is the (certain) return on the riskless asset. Suppose further
that the additional income transferred to the Treasury as a result of these earnings by
the central bank is distributed in fraction θp to the passive investors and in fraction
θa = 1 − θp to the active investors. The second-period wealth of investors of type h
will then equal
W h2 = (1 + r)W
h
1 + (R− r)xh + θh(R− r)xcb,
where W h1 is the first-period wealth of type h, and x
h is the quantity of the risky
asset held by type h investors. Since both the objective and the constraints of type h
investors depend only on x̃h ≡ xh+θhxcb, the optimal choice of x̃h will be independent
of the central bank’s choice of xcb. Moreover, the condition for market clearing (that
x̃p + x̃a equal the total supply of the risky asset) can be expressed solely in terms of
the two quantities x̃h. Hence the price for the risky asset that clears the market will
be independent of the choice of xcb.
This result implies that in a model satisfying the two postulates, like the one just
sketched, direct (open-market) purchases of assets by the central bank should have
no effect on the equilibrium structure of asset returns. But such a model implies that
lending by the central bank to leveraged borrowers should accomplish little, either.
Unless the central bank is willing to completely replace private sources of funding for
the leveraged investors, they will still have to satisfy the VaR constraint. (It would
not be enough that the central bank serve as the sole source of funding for their
acquisitions of a particular category of risky assets, say mortgage-backed securities
— because the VaR constraint relates to the global situation of a leveraged investor,
it becomes irrelevant only if the central bank can supply all of the active investors’
funding.) Hence the decision problem of both types of investors would remain the
same, and the market-clearing price vector for the various types of risky assets would
remain the same.7
7This argument assumes that the central bank lends at the competitive market interest rate. If the
bank lends at a below-market rate, and ties the quantity lent at the subsidized rate to the quantity
that an investor holds of a particular asset, by requiring that asset to be pledged as collateral for
the subsidized loan, this is equivalent to paying investors a specified subsidy s per unit held of the
asset. This should obviously be expected to change the equilibrium price of the asset in question,
and is potentially an alternative explanation for the findings of these authors about the effects of
on the prices of particular MBS of eligibility for funding under the TALF.
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It is thus important to the conclusions of Ashcraft et al. that they do not assume
a global leverage constraint, such as the VaR constraint proposed by Adrian and
Shin, but rather an asset-specific margin constraint. Under this type of constraint,
a central-bank policy of lending to finance purchases of a particular kind of risky
asset, with a lower margin requirement than the one imposed by the market, can
substantially change the demand for that asset, even if the quantity of lending involved
is only a small fraction of overall lending in the economy, or even of overall lending
to leveraged intermediaries.
In fact, although it is not the main focus of their paper, the model proposed by
Ashcraft et al. is also one in which targeted asset purchases by the central bank are
not, in general, predicted to be irrelevant for asset price determination. If the central
bank acquires a risky asset with a positive margin requirement, and redistributes
the resulting increase in its state-contingent portfolio earnings at least partially to
leveraged investors, then the optimal response of leveraged investors will not simply be
to reduce their holdings of that asset by the amount θaxcb, in the case of no change
in the prices of any assets. For while such a change in the portfolio choice of the
leveraged investors would restore the same state-contingent value of W a2 as would have
existed in the absence of the central bank’s asset purchases, these investors’ leverage
constraint will be relaxed by the change. In the case that the leverage constraint
was previously binding (as in the equilibria discussed by Ashcraft et al.), relaxation
of the constraint will allow the active investors to borrow more and purchase greater
quantities of risky assets subject to margin requirements. The market for these assets
will then no longer clear at the same vector of prices as before. The Modigliani-Miller
theorem is broken by the assumption of asset-specific margin requirements, so that
the leverage constraint of active investors cannot be expressed as a function solely of
the random variable W a2 .
It is therefore a matter of considerable importance for the theory of unconven-
tional monetary policies, not simply whether there are binding constraints on the de-
gree of leverage that is acceptable to those funding leveraged investors, but whether
these leverage constraints involve only the total state-contingent wealth of leveraged
investors (as in the case of a value-at-risk constraint), or whether they involve asset-
specific margin constraints (as proposed here). While some implications of the two
types of theories are broadly similar — for example, both imply that developments
that redistribute wealth away from leveraged investors should raise equilibrium risk
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premia, by tightening the leverage constraints on these investors, and that the re-
sulting price movements should tend to further redistribute in the same direction,
thus amplifying the direct effects of any such disturbance — they have quite different
implications for the effects of central-bank asset purchases and lending facilities.
2 Does This Theory Account for the Effects of the
Fed’s Programs?
To what extent does the proposed model succeed in accounting for the effects of
the Fed’s unusual lending programs? Ashcraft et al. present interesting evidence
regarding the effects of Fed lending under the TALF. Their evidence indicates that
TALF lending did affect the prices of assets that were eligible for use as collateral
for borrowing under this program. It should be noted that the question addressed in
their main empirical result (the regression results of section 3.3) is a fairly narrow one;
in particular, they look only at the differential effect on commercial mortgage-backed
securities that were eligible for the TALF program relative to the effect on similar
securities that were not eligible. This means that their method “differences out” any
effects of the TALF on asset prices that occur through relaxation of investors’ capital
constraints, as effects through this channel would affect the shadow value of relaxation
of the margin constraints on all asset purchases, and hence would have similar effects
on all assets subject to similar margin requirements, whether TALF-eligible or not.
But while the method is not suited to provide a quantitative estimate of the
overall effects of the TALF on asset prices, their results do suffice to establish that
the effects of the introduction of the TALF were not zero. This conclusion does allow
one to exclude some potential theories; for example, unless one supposes that loans
under the TALF were made at a subsidized rate of interest, it allows one to reject the
hypothesis that the only constraint on leverage is a global constraint like the value-
at-risk constraint discussed above. And the model proposed in this paper is at least
one that can account for a non-zero differential effect of the kind that is measured.
Nonetheless, I am not convinced that this model alone can account for all of
the relevant facts. Note that while the model of Ashcraft et al. can account for
differential effects of central-bank acceptance of particular assets as collateral, as








































































































Figure 1: Spreads between yields on four different classes of commercial paper and
the 1-month OIS rate, together with the value of paper acquired by the Fed under
its Commercial Paper Funding Facility. (Source: Federal Reserve Board.)
targeted asset purchases by the central bank. As explained in the previous section,
this model, unlike the model of Adrian and Shin (2010), does predict that open-
market purchases of assets by the central bank will generally change equilibrium
asset prices. But the effect on asset prices occurs purely as a consequence of the
relaxation of the capital constraint of the leveraged investors; hence the effect should
be the same on all assets with similar margin requirements. This means that there
should be no differential effect on the price of assets purchased by the central bank,
relative to the prices of similar assets that happen not to be purchased by the central
bank.
While the effects of these programs are only beginning to be studied, the available
evidence is not obviously consistent with this prediction. For example, Figure 1 shows
the effects of Federal Reserve purchases of commercial paper under the Commercial
8
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), introduced in October 2008.8 The heavy solid line
plots the total value of the commercial paper purchased by the Fed under this pro-
gram; the several lighter and/or dashed lines plot the spreads between the yields
on various categories of commercial paper and the one-month overnight interest-rate
swap rate (essentially a market forecast of the average level of the federal funds rate
over the coming month). The explosion of the commercial paper spreads in Septem-
ber 2008 indicates the distress in these markets, following the default of Lehman
Brothers on its paper and the consequent runs on U.S. money-market mutual funds.
The figure shows that in the case of the three types of AA-rated commercial paper
(all of which were eligible for purchase by the Fed under the CPFF), spreads fell
sharply as soon as purchases under the CPFF began. The figure also shows that in
the case of A2/P2 commercial paper (lower-rated, but still prime-grade paper issued
by non-financial corporations, and not eligible for purchase under the CPFF), spreads
remained very high for several more weeks.
While the evidence presented in this figure is much more casual than that offered
by Ashcraft et al. in their study of the effects of the TALF, here too it seems that
(i) the Fed’s asset purchases affected asset prices, contrary to the Modigliani-Miller
argument; and (ii) there was a particular effect on the prices of the specific securities
purchased by the Fed, relative to those of other securities that were more similarly
affected by market conditions in general. While observation (i) is consistent with the
model proposed by Ashcraft et al., observation (ii) is not.9 And there is an alternative
way of breaking the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which is to deny the postulate that
all investors can purchase the same spectrum of assets at the same market prices (and
negligible transactions costs).
The implications of this alternative hypothesis of market segmentation for the
effects of targeted asset purchases by the central bank are developed (in the context
of a complete DSGE model of the monetary transmission mechanism) by Cúrdia
and Woodford (2010). Under this view, certain assets are only purchased (or only
8For further discussion of this program and its effects, see Adrian et al. (2010) and Kacperczyk
and Schnabl (2010).
9Note that these observations are also inconsistent with the hypothesis that the effects of the
TALF were due simply to the Fed’s having made a certain kind of collateral a condition for obtaining
a loan at a subsidized rate. Under that interpretation of the effects of lending under the TALF, one
would not expect to see similar effects of direct asset purchases by the Fed, of the kind shown in
Figure 1.
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purchased at low cost) by “specialists”, who have an advantage over other investors
in this particular activity. The Modigliani-Miller theorem no longer holds if the
central bank purchases assets of this kind, if not all of the addition to the central
bank’s state-contingent portfolio earnings is distributed to the “specialists”; for other
investors will not reduce their holdings of the assets in question, even if the change in
their state-contingent tax liabilities gives them a hedging motive for doing so, owing to
their non-participation in that market. Moreover, under this mechanism, the central
bank’s purchases have a disproportionate effect on demand for the particular assets
that it purchases (rather than increasing demand for all assets that are subject to
margin requirements, by relaxing the capital constraints of leveraged investors), and
the hypothesis of market segmentation makes it particularly likely that a substantial
change in the price of those particular assets will be required for market clearing. The
hypothesis of market segmentation also provides an alternative potential explanation
for programs like the TALF. Targeted lending to the “specialists” who are able to
purchase a particular kind of asset — and who have been forced to curtail their
purchases owing to capital constraints, or some other disruption of the availability
of funding for their activity — can similarly affect asset prices, and should similarly
have a differential effect on the prices of the particular assets the purchases of which
can be funded under the targeted lending program.
3 Is Credit Policy Equivalent to Interest-Rate
Policy?
Even granting the conclusion that programs like the TALF or the CPFF can influ-
ence financial market conditions, there remains the important question whether such
programs are nonetheless equivalent (or nearly equivalent) in their effects to some
adjustment of the level of the federal funds rate, so that there is no need for a central
bank to act on these other dimensions as well — or at least, no need for it to use
them as long as further adjustments of the policy rate remain possible.
Ashcraft et al. show in the context of their model that central-bank lending to
finance purchases of risky assets that are subject to high margin requirements (or
for that matter, direct central-bank purchases of such assets) are not equivalent to a
reduction of the riskless rate of interest in their effects on investment spending. This is
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because in their model, an interest-rate cut will increase the shadow value of relaxation
of the capital constraint of leveraged investors, thus increasing the relative cost of
investment in assets subject to high margin requirements. Central-bank lending to
finance purchases of such assets with less collateral, or direct purchases of such assets,
will instead relax that constraint, lowering the relative cost of investment in assets
subject to high margin requirements; hence the effects of the two policies on the
composition of aggregate expenditure are quite different.
It would be interesting to see evidence of this effect of monetary policy on relative
asset demands. But the general conclusion is quite robust. Once one’s model has mul-
tiple interest rates in it, and the possibility of variable spreads between them, there
arises the possibility that different dimensions of financial conditions will be differ-
entially affected by alternative central-bank policies. Under the conditions discussed
above that imply a Modigliani-Miller theorem, one can actually show that there is
only one relevant dimension of central-bank policy, namely, traditional interest-rate
policy;10 but under almost any assumptions that break the Modigliani-Miller theorem,
alternative central-bank policies will be able to influence more than one dimension
of financial conditions. Moreover, changes in the structure of relative yields on dif-
ferent kinds of financial claims will generally have consequences for the allocation of
resources, so that there is no reason in general to suppose that interest-rate policy
alone will suffice to achieve desirable adjustments of financial conditions in response
to the disturbances to which the economy may be subject. The possible welfare gains
from active use of central-bank credit policy alongside interest-rate policy are illus-
trated in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) in the context of one particular (fairly simple)
model with endogenous credit spreads.
Yet despite this general observation, it is worth noting that the effectiveness of
central-bank credit policy does depend on binding financial constraints of one kind or
another, that break the Modigliani-Miller theorem. One can also reasonably expect
that the effects of such policies are only substantial when the financial constraints are
significant. This is surely true at some times; the kind of severe financial crisis that
we have recently experienced provides a prime example. But it is less obvious whether
the benefits of active credit policy should be large under more routine circumstances.
Given the prudential arguments for preferring not to involve central banks in the
allocation of credit (summarized, for example, by Goodfriend, 2009), it may be wise
10Again, see Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) for further development of this point.
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to reserve the use of these additional dimensions of policy for the unusual conditions
associated with a financial crisis.
12
References
[1] Adrian, Tobias, and Hyun Song Shin, “Financial Intermediaries and Monetary
Economics,” in B.M. Friedman and M. Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary
Economics, vol. 3A, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming 2010.
[2] Adrian, Tobias, Karin Kimbrough, and Dina Marchioni, “The Federal Reserve’s
Commercial Paper Funding Facility,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Report no. 423, January 2010.
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